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Introduction
In the light of falling tariffs and transport cost, the importance of institutional barriers to trade has captured much attention in recent research.
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The existence of a language barrier in trade has been documented in numerous empirical studies. Rose (2000) finds that countries sharing a common language trade 1.5 times more with each other. Anderson and van Windcoop (2004) estimate that the tax equivalent of the language barrier amounts to seven percent.
While gravity models of aggregate trade flows find robust evidence for the language barrier, these models remain silent on the question of the channel through which language affects trade. From a logical point of view, it is even questionable if language should affect international trade at all, given that international trade flows consist mainly of manufactures. For instance, in order to trade two manufacturing goods between the US and China only one translator is required, whose services are unlikely to affect total trading cost. Also the fact that with China and Japan two countries with relatively few fluent English speakers are among the top five trading nations contradicts the importance of language for manufacturing trade. Services trade, on the other hand, often requires the ability of both the service provider and his customer to communicate directly with each other.
Quebec will require explanations, software, and support services in French. To see exactly how language can affect trade patterns, imagine the following scenario: There are two regions, whose populations speak different languages. Translation is costly. If some products require more communication between buyer and seller for trade to proceed, translation cost will more adversely affect trade in those products. If more people learn the other's language, total translation cost will fall. Hence, I propose the following hypothesis: ceteris paribus, a high language commonality between two regions should disproportionately help communicationintensive industries to trade.
With respect to the type of communication used, I distinguish between direct or spoken communication and indirect or written communication. I expect direct communication to have a larger effect on the volume of trade than indirect communication: Assume there are two communication-intensive industries, one of which requires spoken communication, whereas the other industry has a large need to exchange written documents in order to trade. While direct communication has to occur simultaneously between two individuals, indirect communication often requires not more than a one-time service like translating catalogs, advertisements, or letter templates. Thus total translation cost will be higher in the case of direct communication. Hence, direct communication-intensive industries are more likely to be affected by the language barrier.
In order to thoroughly test my hypotheses, I diverge from the standard gravity framework in two important ways: First, I study the impact of language differences on trade within one country only, which limits bias of the language estimates from other institutional differences, such as legal, historical or social ties. This downweights the possibility that my language estimates capture some home bias (or border) effects that are well-known to the international trade literature.
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Second, the estimation equation includes fixed-effects for each bilateral pairing of Canadian provinces and territories as well as fixed-industry effects. Thus the estimates will only pick-up variation between industries and province pairings, thereby taking out heterogeneity that is unrelated to the potential language-trade channel I seek to identify. This paper focuses on Canada, which is the only OECD country with more than one official language for which detailed inter-regional data on trade flows is available. While this choice limits the scope of the study and the number of potential sources of language variation, it offers at least three advantages. Firstly, the relative uniformity of Canada's legal and social system alleviates institutional bias that is possibly present in studies of international trade. As communication-intensive industries are often contract-intensive as well, estimates from cross-country regressions would be likely to incorporate effects of comparative advantage in regions with sound legal institutions (Nunn, 2007) . Secondly, recent research points out that the caveat of taking up border effects is significantly lower in intra-national trade. Hummels and Hillberry (2003) showed that intra-US trade is unlikely to suffer from intranational border effects.
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Similarly, Combes et al. (2003) estimate that in France more than 60% of the potential intra-national home bias can be explained by internal migration and cultural networks. Such network effects between Canadian provinces and territories are likely to be primarily determined by linguistic differences, since Helliwell (1997) already pointed out that internal migration has little trade creating effect within Canada. Finally, the arguments presented above for the existence of a language-trade channel should be mainly relevant for service-intensive industries. Therefore I refrain from studying intra-European trade (which otherwise would make a perfect case for the language-trade link), because services are not sufficiently liberalized across EU members (e.g. Kox and Lejour, 2005; Kox and Lejour, 2006) . This paper introduces a new way to thinking about the gravity model of trade that rests on the work by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Romalis (2004), and Nunn (2007) . These papers use industry-and cross-country-variation to identify sources of a country's comparative advantage across industries. I adapt their approach for a single country setting, where I exploit trade variation across industries and bilateral province pairings. Specifically, I eliminate any variation, which is not needed to test the main hypothesis: trade in communication-intensive industries is higher between provinces with a higher language commonality. The model I estimate is then:
where ln trade ijk is the natural logarithm of the bilateral trade flow from province i to province j in industry k. The fixed-bilateral effects δ ij take up all trade variation for each country pairing that is constant across industries. Similarly, δ k are industry fixed-effects that are constant across bilateral trade flows. Compared to the traditional gravity model, the bilateral fixedeffects do not allow using variables that are constant across country pairings. Thus, the impact of distance on trade is proxied with the log of the interaction between the transport-intensity of a sector, trans k , and distance, dist ij . In order to capture differences in comparative ad-
reflects differences in the structure of production between two provinces. The main variable of interest is the interaction of c k and lang ij , in which c k reflects the need for communication and lang ij stands for the language commonality between two provinces. ijk is a random error. As common in the literature (e.g. Anderson and van Windcoop, 2003; Melitz, 2008) , I assume that imports and exports are affected symmetrically by the interaction effects.
The approach here is conceptually different from industry-level gravity models that estimate the semi-elasticity of the language commonality with respect to trade (e.g. Deardorff, 1998; Hummels, 2001 ). The bilateral fixed-effects capture the direct effect of the language commonality on the volume of trade in my estimation equation. Hence, the coefficient of interest β 3 only captures the effect that language commonality has on the pattern of trade and provides no direct interpretation as a semi-elasticity of the language barrier.
The estimates of (1) should not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the language-trade channel. First, there may be determinants of trade that are omitted from (1). As a matter of fact Canada's English speaking provinces tend to be richer and domicile more Protestants than Catholics compared to their French speaking counterparts. Therefore, a primary concern is that c k lang ij may be simply capturing the fact that wealth and religion shape intra-Canadian trade patterns. I carefully control for these alternative determinants of the language-trade channel. Second, the direction of causality implied by equation (1) may be wrong. If trade fosters the adoption of the other's language, causality might run from trade to language. In consequence, estimates of β 3 may be biased. In section 5, I instrument for language variation that is unaffected by this feedback effect. Finally, this paper concentrates on the analysis of positive exports and imports. Thus the interpretation of the estimates is conditional on a province trading in an industry, thereby disregarding the effect of language on the decision to enter an industry. I check for the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of zero trade in section 6.
The Data
The most disaggregated inter-provincial trade data available for Canada are at the 2-digit industry level. The data comprise all recorded (non-zero) inter-regional trade flows of Canada's ten provinces and three territories for the year 2001.
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The final data classify in 38 industries that comprise agriculture, manufacturing and service industries. I study trade across all sectors, which is different from other studies that solely focus on manufacturing trade (e.g. Nunn, 2007; Romalis, 2004; Hummels, 2001) . I have numerous reasons for this approach: The first reason is that Canada's internal trade differs from international trade, where services trade is negligible compared to manufactures. In 2001, service trade accounted for 56.7% of total intra-Canadian trade flows. The second reason is that the language channel should be present across all sectors of the economy. Particularly, the service sector is likely to be more language-sensitive than manufactures. So leaving out one of the sectors would narrow the scope of this study.
Provincial gross domestic products in current prices as well as population estimates have been retrieved from the Statistics Canada home-page. The distance variable is from Feenstra (2004) , who provides distances between the capitals of Canadian provinces. I added distances for each pairing that involves trade with the three territories (Northwest Territory, Nunavut, and Yukon Territory), using the respective longitudes and latitudes.
Language Variables
In contrast to the language proxies used in previous studies, this paper measures language commonality as the probability that any two people from different provinces picked at random will be able to communicate with each other.
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Compared to previous measures that reflect some aspect of language commonality, this variable is more in line with theory, because trade requires a sufficient knowledge of the trading partner's language in order to reduce translation cost.
The measure of language commonality between provinces is constructed from the Census survey. The survey asks for mother tongue, knowledge of official languages, and use of languages at work. The statistics show clearly that the language barrier cannot be represented by the distribution of mother tongues within the population: 17.6% of all Canadians have a mother tongue different from the two official languages. Yet only 1.5% of all Canadians are unable to speak at least one of the two official languages, which measures the real ability of people to communicate with each other. Across provinces, only the Inuit population in the Nunavut territories constitutes an exception with 13.1% of the population knowing neither English nor French. While in most provinces more than 97% of the population speaks English as first or second language, Quebec (45.4%) and New Brunswick (90.7%) are the two exceptions with relatively few English speakers.
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In addition, I control for potential Chinese networks within Canada that have been shown to be relevant for international trade flows (Rauch, 2002) . With 2.7%, Canada's Chinese minority supplies the third largest language group of Canada's working population. Different from other minorities, 42% of speakers with a Chinese mother tongue also use non-official languages often or sometimes at work, as table 2 shows. No other language group uses nonnative languages at work so frequently. As I analyze the language knowledge across the total population, I use the population share with Chinese origin as a proxy for knowledge of Chinese .
For each bilateral pairing ij, the variable for language commonality is constructed as follows :
where l = {English, F rench, Chinese }. English is the sum of people knowing English and people knowing English and French, divided by the total population of the province. The F rench and Chinese measures are constructed similarly. lang ij is not bound at one, since people may be fluent in several languages. However, I restrict the probability that two randomly chosen people are able to communicate with each other to one in cases, where I calculate values slightly larger than one. Based on equation (2), I also construct a measure for religious (denominational) commonality, where l={Anglicans, Baptists, Buddhists, Catholics, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, United church}. Table 3 depicts the resulting language commonality for all bilateral country pairings. The pairings range from Quebec and Nunavut, where the probability that two randomly chosen people understand each other is 43.1%, to Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island, where everybody speaks the same language. Virtually all variation in language knowledge comes from the two French speaking provinces and the territories, whereas the pairing Ontario/British Columbia exhibits the lowest language commonality (0.962) among the English speaking provinces.
Communication-intensities of Industries
My argument hinges on a careful choice of c k , the proxy for differences in the industry-specific need of direct and indirect communication between importer and exporter. Rauch (1999) classifies manufacturing goods on whether they are traded on an exchange, reference priced or neither of both. However, I refrain from using his classification for two reasons. Firstly, it only captures manufacturing goods, yet the services sector is an important pillar of intra-Canadian trade that accounts for much of the language-related variation, as will be seen below. Secondly, it is not possible to extend his classification to services, because services are typically neither reference priced nor traded on exchanges. Nonetheless, it is of particular interest to have a measure that proxies the language-intensity of services trade, because service provision often depends on face-to-face communication with the importer, which bears high translation 7 cost if agents speak different languages.
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Therefore, I construct a new measure for the communication-intensity of industries that takes advantage of detailed input output (IO) tables. IO data are available for the manufacturing as well as the service sector and allow me to rank all industries according to their need for communication between trading partners. Thereby I implicitly assume that the input structure of communication services proxies the need for direct and indirect communication between exporter and importer. Given the relatively high level of aggregation of the trade data, all this assumption postulates is that if the printing industry needs a larger share of communication inputs than the paper industry relative to its total inputs, trading printing products also requires more communication for trade. I measure the direct communicationintensity by the share of telecommunications services in total inputs for each industry. The Indirect communication-intensity is measured by the input share of postal services. Since the IO tables at M-level aggregation (2-digit level) exist only for Canada as a whole, I assume that the average Canadian input structure persists across provinces. This strong assumption is less problematic in the Canadian case, where production structures are relatively similar, than in cross-country studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Nunn, 2007) .
The resulting ranking seems reasonable by common sense, as can be seen in table 4. The share of telecommunication inputs ranges from 0.05% (Fishery) to 5.3% (Professional services). As expected, table 4 shows that service industries are more communication-intensive than manufacturing industries. Among manufacturing industries, more complex products are generally ranked higher, which is consistent with the Rauch (1999) classification, where more complex manufactures such as electronic equipment are rarely reference-priced or traded on an exchange. With respect to postal service inputs, the basic pattern persists that services are more communication-intensive that manufactures. Yet there is variation between the relative ranking of industries within each sector.
Finally, industries are ranked according to their relative cost of transportation, presupposing that distance has a larger trade diverting impact on industries with higher transport cost. I calculate the share of transport margins in total inputs, which is defined as the charges paid to a third part in order to deliver a product from the producer to the (intermediate or final) purchaser. The ranking of the transport variable in table 4 shows that services generally have lower transportation cost than manufactures. Particularly heavy industries rank high, e.g. metal, mineral products, chemical, and motor vehicle industries.
7 Experiments with the Rauch data proved inconclusive. I manually matched classifications and calculated the percentage of goods that are neither reference priced nor traded on public exchanges for each manufacturing industry. However, the estimated effects are only significant if trade flows in the (language-insensitive) petroleum and coal industries are included in the sample. This result supports the idea that translation cost are negligible in Canadian manufacturing trade. Similarly, Rauch (2002) finds no significant trade-deterring effect of language on trade in differentiated manufacturing goods at the international level.
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Summary statistics are presented in table 5. As all interactions are obtained from the multiplication of two shares, their actual values are very low. It is therefore impossible to interpret the estimates of β 3 directly. Table 6 reports cross-correlations of the interaction terms. The high correlation between most variables imposes a potential multicollinearity problem, which could inflate t-statistics. To alleviate such problems, I avoid to lump all variables together in one regression, and run separate regressions for each variable of interest in section 6.
If not otherwise indicated, I drop the fuel as well as the petroleum and coal industries from the sample. As these industries are unlikely to be very language-sensitive, the high trade volumes in both industries could bias the estimates downward.
Empirical Results
Before the regression results are discussed, I will present some graphical evidence that supports the choice of the functional form. Figure 1 displays non-parametric regressions of equation (1), using the multivariate scatter plot smoother by Royston and Cox (2005) . The Royston and Cox algorithm smoothes non-parametric estimates for each independent variable conditional on the other independent variables. Because these locally smoothed estimates require no assumptions about the functional form of the relationship, this method provides a check for the specification of equation (1).
The left part of figure 1 plots the partial effect of telecom k lang ij against the logarithm of the volume of trade. The estimates are conditional on production differentials, the distance measure, bilateral and industry-fixed-effects as well as the interaction between language and postal services. The figure indicates that the non-parametric estimates are sufficiently linear to justify the choice of the functional form in (1). Also, the predictive power of the partial estimate is relatively high, as the tight confidence intervals show. The figure shows that trade increases in the interaction between language commonality and the direct communication measure. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that common language has a more pronounced effect on communication-intensive industries. Since all observations to the right of 0.0083 on the horizontal axis belong to services industries, the graph also indicates that most language-related variation in Canadian trade stems from service industries.
Similarly, the right part of figure 1 displays non-parametric estimates of the postal services interaction from the same regression. The graph shows that the volume of trade is straightly decreasing in the interaction of language with the indirect communication proxy. Because these estimates are conditional on the inclusion of the telecommunication-language interaction, the figure indicates that the partial effect of indirect communication on trade is 9 potentially negative.
Parametric estimates of equation (1) of more than 0.40. The high explanatory power of the models is also reflected in large Fstatistics. As expected, the transport-distance interaction has a significant negative impact on inter-provincial trade in all models. The intuition for this estimate is that trade with distant provinces is particularly low for transport-intensive industries.
In accordance with standard trade theory I find that specialization affects trade positively. The estimate implies an average impact of prod ijk on trade of 39%, given the standard deviation of 0.045 of the production differential within an industry. There is, however, less evidence for the presence of an indirect communication channel. The post k lang ij variable in column (2) is statistically and economically insignificant. Only when both interactions are included together as in column (3), post k lang ij becomes significant. This could be due the high correlation between post k and telecom k that blows up test statistics. The estimated partial impact of telecom k lang ij nearly doubles. This indicates that industries that rely on direct interaction in order export their products trade more between areas with a high language commonality. On the other hand, I now estimate a significantly negative partial effect of the postal services interaction on trade. While the significance of this effect should be interpreted with great care due to potential multicollinearity problems, one can say that the evidence for an indirect communication channel via mail is less conclusive.
The estimates of β 3 might be biased if determinants of trade have been omitted from (1) that are correlated with the explanatory variables. Warren (2003) argues that the economic development of the French speaking provinces was retarded. Within Quebec most businesses were in the hands of an English speaking minority before strong French-promoting legislation was passed in the 1970s. If Canada's English speaking population were more affluent, all I capture with the language interaction would be a wealth effect. Hence, I control for the interaction between telecommunication and joint provincial GDP per capita in column (4). The insignificance of the estimate and the fact that the estimated β 3 remains practically unchanged indicate that I am really capturing language effects.
Another reason for bias of β 3 could be that other institutional variables that are correlated 8 I calculated the effect as %∆trade ijk = 100 * β 2 * 0.045 = 100 * 8.647 * 0.045 = 38.91%. with language have been omitted from equation (1). It could be that the foremost Catholic population in French-speaking Canada distrusts Protestant business partners or exhibits different demand patterns. If this were the case, the alleged language effect would really capture religious affiliation. Although Lipset (1990) argues that religion has a smaller role in Canadian everyday life than in the US, religious commonality has been shown to affect international trade patterns (e.g. Lewer and van den Berg, 2007; Helble, 2007) . Hence, I control for the probability that two randomly chosen people from two states have the same denomination. The religion measure is highly correlated with language commonality (0.72). Yet the estimate in column (5) is insignificant, while β 3 remains a significant determinant of trade. The fact that the estimate still is of similar magnitude is evidence in favor of the language channel. 
IV Results
Although the approach taken here reduces several potential sources of bias that are present in standard gravity models, the estimate of β 3 could still be subject to endogeneity. I deal with this issue using legal language status as an instrumental variable (IV). While Canada's Official Language Act of 1969 guarantees equal legal status of both English and French with respect to federal administrative services, federal courts, and in Parliament, some provinces enacted additional language laws. Particularly, Quebec and New Brunswick passed own official language acts during the 1970s that promote the use of French at the work place, in educational institutions, and for administrative procedures. The Official Languages of New Brunswick Act was first enacted in 1973 and later on revised. Likewise, Amendment 16.1 of the Canadian constitution, which was enacted in 1993, reinforces the equal status of the French language in New Brunswick. Quebec passed the Official Language Act (Bill 22) in 1974 and the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) in 1977. Warren (2003) argues that these laws triggered a revival of the French language in everyday life and also in business, where English was to become the primary language in the 1970s. Lazear (1999) shows that the protection of minority interests by the government reduces incentives to learn the majority language, implying lower knowledge of English in those regions that guarantee specific language rights. Therefore I use the legal language status across provinces as an instrument for the probability that two people from two provinces speak the same language. In particular, I use the interaction c k legal ij as an instrument for c k lang ij , where c k is assumed to be exogenous. As legal language status is predetermined and unaffected by the trade flow in 2001, it is a suitable instrument to isolate exogenous variation in language commonality. The variable legal ij is a dummy, which is one if Quebec or New Brunswick are a trading partner in a bilateral pairing, two for trade flows between these two provinces, and zero otherwise.
The IV estimates are reported in table 8. I only report second stage estimates. The statistics from the first stage regressions indicate that the IV estimator can be used. Columns (1)-(4) report large F statistics and high partial R 2 s of the first stage regressions. Also, the instrument c k legal ij is significantly partially correlated with c k lang ij in the first stage regression. The IV estimate of lang ij telecom k in (1) is positive and statistically significant, supporting the hypothesis of a language-trade channel. However, the estimate is larger than the OLS estimate in table 7, not smaller, as the potential reverse causality suggests. This could indicate a weak instrument, yet neither the partial correlations, nor the t-statistic suggest presence of a weak correlation. The Cragg and Donald (1993) test for weak instruments rejects the hypothesis that the equation is only weakly identified. To test for local average treatment effects, I drop the three territories from the sample, since they are partly inhabited by natives. This reduces much of the language variation that cannot be attributed to laws affirming the use of French in business. The estimate in (2) decreases to a value 23.91 which is close to the OLS estimates. This corresponds to an increase of trade in the health industry by 0.26% if lang ij increases by 1%.
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Column (3) reports that indirect communication is not significantly related to the volume of trade, which is in line with the estimates from the fixed-effects regressions. I also compare the importance of indirect and direct communication in column (4). Instrumenting for both interaction terms and dropping the territories, the estimates confirm that language affects trade only in those industries with a high share of direct communication inputs.
Robustness
The following section tests the sensitivity of my results to the choice of the sample and potential bias of the estimates due to the focus on positive trade flows. Table 9 reports the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to the removal of influential observations and the choice of the language variable. The estimates of β 3 are obtained from separate regressions of equation (1) As a first robustness check, I estimate equation (1) with the full sample, including the fuel and coal and petroleum industries. Unsurprisingly, this reduces the estimate slightly, because both industries are unlikely to be affected by language differences. Then I examine if the estimates change if I drop all trade flows with the three territories from the sample. Yet the estimate for inter-provincial trade is of similar size. As a final test, I consider if my results reflect a mere one-off effect for the year 2001. Using 1998 trade, GDP, IO data, as well as Census data on language and ethnicity variables from 1996, I can confirm that the language-trade effects are statistically significant and of similar size.
As a second robustness check, I run the above regressions with an alternative proxy for language commonality. While lang ij proxies the potential for communication in the total population of two provinces, I use the probability that two randomly chosen people from two province use the same official language at work as an alternative measure. This measure would be preferred if one wants to account for the importance of language in business networks. Due to data availability, the measure work ij can only be constructed for 2001. work ij and lang ij are highly correlated. Table 9 reports that the estimates are statistically significant and of similar size in all samples. Overall, the robustness checks support the preceding fixed-effects and IV results: The telecommunication interactions are statistically significant in all models, whereas a higher language commonality has no significant impact on trade in postal serviceintensive sectors. Hence, intra-Canadian trade patterns reveal a language-trade channel in industries that depend on direct rather than indirect communication.
Finally, I test if the above analysis is sensitive to the exclusion of zero trade flows from the sample. In order to account for these, I set all observations for which trade flows are not reported to zero. A log-transformation of zero values is not possible, but several methods have been suggested to deal with this issue. Sample selection procedures would probably be the most elegant way to adjust the estimates for zero observations. However, the estimation of sample selection models requires that at least one independent variable explains the selection process but is not partially correlated with the dependent variable (in order not to rely on distributional assumptions). While such exclusion restrictions can be justified for international trade flows (Helpman et al., 2008) , it is hardly possible to find such variables for the intra-country trade data used here.
To get around the selection problem, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest the use of the Poisson model for gravity equations. The Poisson estimator uses all positive and zero observations in a way that allows to interpret the coefficients similar to gravity estimates. Although it is typically used for count data, the Poisson estimator is consistent as long as the mean function is correctly specified. Helpman et al. (2008) confirm that the Poisson method yields similar estimates as their generalized gravity equation, which employs a two-stage procedure 13 to account for the intensive and extensive margin of trade.
While most Poisson estimates in table 10 are of similar size as the fixed-effects estimates, the inclusion of zero trade flows has a strong effect on the distance estimate. The estimated trade barrier of distance is more than twice as large. This indicates that the predominant reason not to enter a trade relationship with another province is transport cost. Columns (1) and (2) report regression results for all possible provinces-industries combinations. The estimates of the interaction terms are of similar magnitude as the fixed-effects estimates. In columns (2) and (4), I drop the fuel as well as the petroleum and coal industries from the sample. Now the magnitude of the language interactions resembles the IV estimates from table 9. Hence, the Poisson regressions indicate that language differences impact the intensive margin of trade between Canadian provinces and territories rather than the extensive margin. The decision to enter into trade relations with another province seems to be primarily driven by transport cost considerations.
Conclusion
In this paper, I identify one mechanism that could justify the empirical evidence for the language barrier to trade in gravity models. I argue that language commonality should disproportionately foster trade in industries requiring more direct communication with the importer in order to trade, if high translation cost erect trade barriers.
To test for the existence of such a mechanism, this paper breaks new ground in the empirical trade literature. Firstly, it focuses on a single country, Canada, to test for languageinduced differences in intra-industry trade. This reduces bias from other institutions that is potentially present in cross-country studies. Secondly, I deviate from standard gravity models by introducing bilateral fixed-effects and industry fixed-effects, thereby eliminating all variation that does not contribute to identify the proposed language channel of trade. Finally, I am able to control for potential endogeneity within the language-trade channel, using exogenous variation of the legal language status within Canadian provinces.
The findings support the proposed language-trade mechanism. The language barrier is larger for industries, which require more direct communication in order to trade their products. Particularly service industries trade more between provinces with a high proportion of same-language speakers. Moreover, the language channel appears to depend on direct (spoken) communication rather than indirect communication by mail. This is in line with Fink et al. (2005) , who demonstrate the importance of international calling prices for the volume of bilateral trade. Finally, the significant negative relationship between the volume of trade and the distance-transport cost interaction holds potential for future applications of this method-ology.
Future research might study in how far the language-trade channel also applies to international trade flows. It is likely that language will prove to be mainly an impediment to services trade and trade in complex goods that require direct communication with the foreign importer. If this were the case, language could turn out to be a source of comparative advantage that allows countries with a higher language commonality to specialize in more advanced goods and services. Note: Note: The estimates are from fixed-effects regressions of equation (1). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral trade between provinces i and j. All specifications include fixed-bilateral and -industry effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Note: The estimates are from fixed-effects instrumental variables regressions of equation (1). The dependent variable is the bilateral trade between provinces i and j. All specifications include fixed-bilateral and -industry effects. In Columns (2) and (4), the sample is restricted to Canada's ten provinces. The Craag and Donald (1993) statistic tests the null hypothesis that the model is weakly identified. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Columns (1) and (3) use all available observations. All specifications include fixed-bilateral and -industry effects. In columns (2) and (4) the industries Fuels, Petroleum and Coal have been dropped. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The share of transport margins in total inputs of industry k. dist ij The bilateral distance between two capital cities of provinces or territories. prod ijk The industry differential in the total production of two provinces. telecom k
The share of telecommunication services in total inputs of industry k. post k
The share of postal services in total inputs of industry k. lang ij The probability that two randomly chosen people from province i and j are able to communicate with each other. work ij The probability that two randomly chosen people from province i and j use the same official language at work.
GDP pc ij
The joint GDP per capita of provinces i and j. religion ij The probability that two randomly chosen people from province i and j have the same religion or denomination.
